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Many attempts have been made in order to analyze and/or unriddle the so-
called “Meno’s ‘Paradox’”. Among those who were more interested in the gen-
eral framework of the dialogue but not particularly and solely in the “paradox” 
itself, Rosemary Desjardins succeeds in forming a wider glance over the whole 
of the dialogue1 which inarguably requires a strenuous effort, and is able to 
“re-collect” answers to the main questions that are posed in the beginning of 
the dialogue such as “what is virtue?” and whether it can be taught or not.
When it comes to her opinion concerning the paradox, Desjardins should indeed 
be called right in her claim that “Meno’s paradox actually strikes with a peculiar-
ly contemporary flavor and force…”2 since it is not preternatural to chance upon 
sophistical reasonings, refutations, “ἐριστικοὶ λόγοι” as Plato described them, in 
the “problems” of contemporary epistemology, the contributors of which usual-
ly assume that those who indulge in etymology and etymological analyses are 
seen as wallowing in some sort of a peculiar “athleticism”3 that is frivolous, and 
in an attempt the result of which is often described as indigent. Etymology, how-
ever, not in its mere form as looking up words from a most trusted and highly ac-
knowledged dictionary, but as philo-logy, as the fundamental basis of any phil-
osophical inquiry, often requires ample effort, intricate analyses and abysmal 
scrutiny through which only, one can savvy the philosophical problem while 
dissecting the text that is in question.
I aim to manifest in this paper using a philological approach that the two claims 
that come together to bring about this eristic argument by no means make a par-
adox. The ‘eristic’ feature of the argument has been emphasized quite a many 
1 Rosemary Desjardins, “Knowledge and Virtue: Paradox in Plato’s ‘Meno’”, The Review of 
Metaphysics, Vol. 39, No.2 (Dec. 1985), pp. 261–281.
2 Ibid., p. 264.
3 Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, Columbia University Press, New York 
1994, p. 8.
Filozofski vestnik   |   Letnik  XXXVIII   |   Številka 1   |   2017   |   7–21
Lale Levin Basut*
Meno's “Paradox”: An Analysis of the 
Eristic Argument
FV_01_2017.indd   7 26. 10. 17   11:08
8lale levin basut
times4, but it seemingly is not conspicuous, and therefore requires further anal-
ysis in order that one can point out where the fallacy exactly rests.
In the following philological analysis I believe I have solved a problem, which 
throughout the history of philosophy, has taken much more credit than it 
should really have.
Many papers point out that Socrates attempts and manages to solve the diffi-
culty regarding one’s knowing some one thing by introducing the discussion 
concerning ἀνάμνησις and calling out for the slave boy.5 Nevertheless once the 
eristic argument is uttered, Socrates immediately presents his judgment for its 
quality, calling it “not sound”, and seems to be somewhat reluctant to meddle 
with sophistic babble. The fact that Socrates simply “changes the subject” and 
seems not keen on discussing further on this point is not because he regards 
the argument as an epistemic dilemma that is unrealizably difficult to deal with 
but because he thinks that it is simply not worth the effort even to try looking 
into it. The discussion concerning ἀνάμνησις on the other hand, which we are 
going to discuss in this paper right after dealing with the eristic argument, is 
introduced separately in the dialogue in order to shed light into how knowing 
comes about. 
Thus, showing what is really eristic/sophistical about the argument seems like 
one task that needs to be fulfilled.
4 Among many see J. T. Bedu-Addo, “Recollection and the Argument ‘From a Hypothesis’ in 
Plato’s Meno, The Journal of Hellenistic Studies, Vol. (1984), pp. 1–14; and also Robert G. 
Hoerber, «Plato’s ‘Meno’» Phronesis, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1960), pp. 78–102.
5 T. Bedu-Addo, op. cit., p. 1, claims that “Socrates describes this paradox as a piece of eristic, 
but he does not dismiss it. To resolve it, he introduces the theory of recollection, ἀνάμνησις 
(81a–e); R. Desjardins, op. cit., p. 265, argues that “Socrates’ way of cutting through dilemma 
is to introduce the theory of recollection”); his conception of the theory of recollection much 
different than that of Dejardins’, and mine being much closer to that of Dejardins’, Dale Jac-
quette also claims that “Socrates’ purpose in examining Meno’s slave is to demonstrate that 
even if knowledge cannot be acquired, the soul is in permanent possession of knowledge of 
Forms, and so has no need to acquire it.” (Dale Jacquette, “Socrates’ Ironic Image of Meno”, 
The Personalist Forum, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 127.)
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Firstly, this argument6 seems to block out any possibility of an inquiry (ζητέιν). 
And this is why it seems to create an ἀπορία, a no way out situation. Since it 
comes with the claim that “one cannot search either for what one knows or what 
one does not know”, it seems to suggest that one is at a loss about starting an 
inquiry concerning some one object. However the “illusion” of the eristic ar-
gument lies exactly here, for the argument hides the area of ζητέιν (inquiry) by 
means of a deliberate word choice, though it is still there for the inquirer. 
I argue that it necessary to make a philological analysis of the argument, point 
out where the fallacy exactly rests and show the possibility of any ζητέιν. In order 
to do this kind of an analysis we should first introduce some types of “knowing”:
Throughout ancient Greek texts ‘knowing’ and ‘knowledge’ are used and said 
in many ways. There are different words used to express the verb ‘to know’ and 
each of them implies knowing in a different sense. Some of these different types 
of knowing are7:
(1) γιγνώσκειν (often interchangeable with γνωρίζειν): a knowledge type that al-
ways follows a certain kind of αἴσϑησις (perception). γιγνώσκειν means recog-
nizing, discerning, distinguishing something, noticing, being aware of some 
one thing, being aware that that one thing is, among many others.
(2) εἰδέναι: (knowing in a wider, more general sense): usually covers for the eve-
rydayness usage of the term “knowing” in situations such as when you need 
to express an “information” you have concerning some one thing.
(3) ἐπίστασϑαι: knowing thoroughly with reasons and principles.
Having introduced these types of knowing, from here let us go back to the text 
only to trace the development of the argument, and using the points that we 
6 “[A] human being cannot search either for what he/she knows or for what he/she does 
not know. He/she cannot search for what he/she knows – since he /she knows it, there is 
no need to search – nor for what he/she does not know, for he/she does not know what to 
look for.” When quoting this passage, I mainly sticked to the Grube translation (Plato, Five 
Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, trans. by G.M.A. Grube, 2nd edition, 
Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis 2002, 80e.) but I felt the need to alter his trans-
lation of ἄνϑρωπως as man to human being, and also the gender of the personal pronouns, 
since ἄνϑρωπως cannot fairly be restricted to men only.
7 For a detailed analysis of different types of knowing see Saffet Babür, “Episteme in Aristo-
tle”, Philosophy in Yeditepe I, Vol. I, (2002), pp. 7–20.
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have introduced so far let us try to unravel what the argument screens, and in 
what way and by means of what it beguiles.
In the passages following 80d a new discussion in the dialogue arises with a 
question directed at Socrates by Meno, who seems to fall short of coming up 
with a solid answer to the question ‘what is virtue?’.
How are you to search for virtue, if you do not know (μὴ οἶσϑα) what it is?8 
After claiming that what Meno is trying to express is an ἐριστικὸς λόγος, Socrates 
once again in his own words utters what he thinks Meno is trying to say9:
...[A] human being cannot search either for what he/she knows (εἰδέναι) or for 
what he/she does not know (εἰδέναι). He/she cannot search for what he knows 
(εἰδέναι) – since he /she knows (εἰδέναι) it, there is no need to search – nor for 
what he/she does not know (εἰδέναι), for he/she does not know (εἰδέναι) what to 
look for.10 (80e) 
It is worth to note here –again- that right after Socrates puts it forth, Meno asks 
Socrates whether he finds this argument (λόγος) beautiful (κάλος) or not, and 
Socrates, thinking no highly of this argument, claims that it is not beautiful. 
The first sentence of the quote goes as follows: “ a human being cannot search 
either for what he/she knows or for what he/she does not know” (ζητεῖν ἀνϑρώπῳ 
οὔτε ὃ οἶδε οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδε). Here the term translated as “knowing” is εἰδέναι, which 
implies knowing in a general, wider sense. Using εἰδέναι for both of these cas-
es, namely when saying ‘a human being cannot search either for what he/she 
knows” and ‘a human being cannot search either for what he/she does not know’ 
gives the impression that both of these types of knowing are said in the same 
sense. However, on the contrary, what we are trying to state with the term “know-
ing” when we say “a human being cannot search either for what he/she knows” 
8 Plato, op. cit., 80e.
9 Although the “paradox” is commonly attributed to Meno himself and thereby called “Me-
no’s Paradox”, I agree with Jon Moline who claims that “Socrates does not ‘restate’ Meno’s 
remark – he slyly replaces it for his own (legitimate) purposes in the dialogue.” Jon Mo-
line, “Meno’s Paradox?”, Phronesis, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1969), p. 154.
10 Plato, op. cit., 80e.
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is dramatically different in comparison to what we mean by the same word when 
we say: “a human being cannot search either for what he/she does not know”. 
Thus, here using εἰδέναι for both of these cases seems to be some sort of a skill-
ful sophistry, a deceit. For according to what we have stated, εἰδέναι implies 
knowing in a wider and general sense. But in the sentences quoted above highly 
specific meanings are hidden behind the term εἰδέναι. The problem with using 
εἰδέναι is that this term not only lacks the power to emphasize these distinct and 
different meanings but also it veils and conceals them. 
When we look further into the argument, we also quickly notice that the deduc-
tion has no formal order but the conclusion statement of the argument is stated 
first. Let us then rewrite the argument in the following order so that we can ob-
serve the reasoning more clearly: 
A human being cannot search for what he/she knows 
— since one knows it, there is no need to search
A human being cannot search for what he/she doesn’t know, 
for one does not know what to look for.
Conclusion: A human being cannot search either for what he/she knows or for 
what he/she does not know
The following analysis of the two premises of the argument aims to shed light to 
the covert meanings of knowing that are veiled by the verb εἰδέναι:
Case/Premise 1: Using of εἰδέναι instead of ἐπίστασϑαι
A human being cannot search either for what he/she knows or for what he/she 
does not know. He/she cannot search for what he/she knows — since he/she 
knows it, there is no need to search – nor for what he/she does not know, for 
he/she does not know what to look for.11 
When we say that “a human being cannot search either for what he/she knows”, 
here we imply knowing something with its causes and principles, knowing or 
11 Ibid., 80e.
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grasping what something really is. This is the exact point where our investigation 
regarding some one object comes to an end12 and where we no longer feel it nec-
essary to inquire about the object in question, but have landed upon a conclu-
sion, namely the what it is for that object to be (τὸ τί ἤν εἶναι)13. To form this type 
of a knowing is not an easy task, but once contrived it implies that the inquiry is 
complete.14
Case/Premise 2: Using of εἰδέναι instead of γνωρίζειν
A human being cannot search either for what he/she knows or for what he/she 
does not know. He/she cannot search for what he knows – since he/she knows 
it, there is no need to search – nor for what he/she does not know, for he/she 
does not know what to look for.15 
12 The search came to an end only because one has now grasped the αἰτίαι and άρχαί (reasons 
and principles), “[s]ince that is when we say we know each thing, when we think we know 
its first cause, while the causes are meant in four ways, of which one is thinghood, or what 
it is for something to be, …” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. by Joe Sachs, Green Lion Press, 
Santa Fe, New Mexico 2002), 983a 29) (τότε γὰρεἰδέναι φαμὲν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν 
οἰώμεϑα γνωρίζειν, τὰ δ’ αἴτια λέγεται τετραχῶς, ὥν μίαν αἰτίαν φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί 
ἦν εἶναι (Aristoteles, Metaphysik, Griechisch–Deutsch, Meiner Verlag, 1991), 983a 29)
13 One can -and justifiably so- ask how a Platonic concept can be elucidated by means of an 
Aristotelian one, for the conventional way of dealing with the ancient texts almost always 
requires and considers as “sensible” the exact opposite of this approach. However, when it 
comes to grasping Aristotelian texts, there comes out a necessity to take Platonic concepts 
as a background or a field of inquiry in order that one can trace the root meanings of the 
concepts which are handed down to Aristotle by no one but Plato himself for him to work 
on and further advance them. Furthermore, the well-crafted concepts of Aristotle offer im-
mense help in dealing with Platonic concepts, which are used relatively looser and again 
with relative less coherency. A Platonic concept is almost always the “root-version” of an 
Aristotelian one, therefore a study of Aristotle without Plato or Plato without Aristotle, as 
is widely practiced, comes off as a slovenly effort. Additionally, not only they are explica-
ble by means of one another but also they stand not as distinct and far off from each other 
in the things that they explain and in the manner they explain them, but quiet the contrary 
they are, with respect to what they do and how they philosophize, complementary.
14 One should perhaps add that the product of ἐπίστασϑαι namely ἐπιστήμη by no means refers 
to “absolute knowledge” but on the contrary when one sees it necessary, namely when the 
conditions or the nature of the object in question change, this result can be reevaluated.
15 Plato, op. cit., 80e.
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When we say “a human being cannot search either for what he/she does not 
know”, what we mean by knowing is more like recognizing, noticing something 
among all the other things, perceiving that that thing is that thing; namely what 
we mean with knowing, in this case is nothing but γνωρίζειν.
γνωρίζειν is one type of knowing which comprises recognizing, noticing or being 
aware of something, being aware that that something is. This “being aware” is a 
necessary condition for the start of each and every inquiry concerning some one 
object. Although necessary as a beginning, it is by itself not adequate enough to 
grasp the nature of the object in question. γνωρίζειν is a beginning and indeed 
an inescapable one, however there is a long and arduous way from γνωρίζειν 
(recognizing) to ἐπίστασϑαι (grasping, understanding, figuring out the nature of 
some one thing). γνωρίζειν comes about only when it is preceded by an αἴσϑησις 
(perception). We should recall the account Aristotle gives of αἴσϑησις, which is 
more articulate and complex in comparison to that of Plato’s which he provides 
us with in his dialogue titled Theaetetus, if we are to understand this concept 
clearly and its difference from any ἐπιστήμη.
In its primary sense and in general Aristotle grasps αἴσϑησις (perception) as 
something that comes about or realizes within a certain range. Everything that 
falls out of this range stands as imperceptible to the animal, and in addition to 
that the excess of a certain quantity of perceptible data (for example: heat or 
cold) could easily destroy the organ of sense. The animal, let it be human or 
non-human, according to this threshold it comprises, “discriminates the things 
perceived”16.
If we try to further expand our explanation, we can claim that according to Ar-
istotle the thing we call αἴσϑησις begins and ends within a certain range. I can 
only capture those objects falling within this range as long as my δύναμις of 
αἴσϑησις allows me to. In humans and other non-human animals there are differ-
ent δυναμεῖς of αἴσϑησις that have different limits and capacities (though in what-
ness what we call αἴσϑησις is the same in both humans and other non-human 
animals) in capturing the different qualities of σῶμα qua σῶμα. Aristotle further 
argues that this κριτικὴ δύναμις called αἴσϑησις is not found in plants, and that 
16 Aristotle, Aristotle’s On the Soul, trans. by Joe Sachs, Green Lion Press, Santa Fe, New Mex-
ico 2004, 424a 5.
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means plants lack such a capacity that comprises a threshold of hearing, sight 
and other basic perceptions. That means while αἴσϑησις requires a κριτικὸν μεσόν, 
plants do not have this sort of a complex structure. Whenever a plant comes in 
contact with something that is warm or something that is cold, it can only be af-
fected from the heat or the cold with its ὕλη (matter). That indicates that the plant 
does not work on or “embroider” the data it receives from the object that is trans-
mitting it the heat or the cold, but it merely receives that data without processing 
it and does so even up to that point which the plant ceases to be.
 
The δύναμις related to αἴσϑησις in animals however makes a distinction between 
things that are to be perceived and does not perceive everything that comes in 
front of it. This is not the case with plants because plants lack κρίνειν. A δύναμις 
of κρίνειν in a being indicates capableness for distinguishing, processing and 
judgment (in a specific sense), and it is, according to Aristotle, an activity that 
comprises λόγος. Because plants do not partake from κρίνειν, we cannot argue 
that they have a δύναμις related to distinguishing, processing, measuring or dis-
criminating.
The following quotes from different passages from Aristotle’s work provide fur-
ther insight on αἴσϑησις, and also explicate its difference from νόησις (thinking):
1. ...[T]he sense is receptive of the forms of perceptible things without their ma-
terial.17 
Here Aristotle aims to state that in perceiving we do not take the ὕλη of the thing 
we are to perceive, and literally put it in our brain. That thing, as a perceivable 
thing, remains there for others who are yet to perceive it. We only contrive its 
εἶδος within ourselves.
The following is a quote from Aristotle’s On Perception and Perceptible Things:
2. ...[P]erception comes about through the body in the soul.18
17 Ibid., 421a 20.
18 Aristotle, On the Soul-Parva Naturalia-On Breath, trans. by W.S. Hett, Harvard University 
Press, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1957, 436b 9.
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It has to be noted that αἴσϑησις itself is not a μέγεϑος (427a 27). What is a μέγεϑος 
is the thing that has the potency to perceive, namely the animal.
3. “..[B]eing a sense, or...being perceptive...is certainly not of any size.”19
4. “...[S]ense perception is a λόγος, and what is excessive undoes or destroys 
λόγος.”20
In the 2nd Book of his treatise called On the Soul Aristotle makes the following 
clear with distinctions made with regard to αἴσϑησις: “sense perception when 
directed at its proper object is always truthful”.21 That is, in the case of basic per-
ceptions such as seeing, hearing, smelling, touching and tasting, if the object 
to be perceived is not far away, i.e. standing within a certain distance, it is not 
possible to speak of a false perception. We have already uttered that αἴσϑησις is 
a κρίνειν and an activity that involves λόγος. Therefore it has to be asserted that 
measuring-eliminating-discriminating is necessary for every single sense per-
ception. For instance in the perception called sight we distinguish the red thing 
from the yellow one; by touching, the hard one from the soft one or the hot one 
from the cold one.
In 426b 15 and cont. Aristotle asks the following: what tells us that the thing that 
is hot and the one that is hard are different? Our δύναμις called αἴσϑησις falls 
short when trying to provide us with an answer to this question. The answer to 
this question should be formed next to or come after an αἴσϑησις, as something 
in addition to it. Individual sense perceptions cannot come up with such dis-
tinctions, for here “something common is being said at a single time” regarding 
the object of both perceptions. Therefore arriving upon such distinction is not 
something that can be achieved solely with the δύναμις called αἴσϑησις, but it is 
something that can be contrived with what we call νόησις (thinking). According 
to Aristotle, from the δυναμεῖς of the soul, αἴσϑησις and φρωνέιν are not the same, 
as some philosophers (as for instance Empedocles) have stated. In addition to 
that, thinking is not “something bodily like perceiving”.22
19 Aristotle, Aristotle’s On the Soul, op. cit., 424a 28.
20 Ibid., 426b 8.
21 Ibid., 427b 12.
22 Ibid., 427a 29.
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While there is sense perception in all animals, thinking through (φρωνέιν) is 
present only in some of them (427b 7). Whereas νόησις (thinking) is distin-
guished from αἴσϑησις in the following aspects:
...[I]n thinking there is what is right and what is not right, right thinking being un-
derstanding and knowing and true opinion, and the opposites of these not being 
right; ...sense perception when directed at its proper objects is always truthful.23
In 418a 7 and cont. Aristotle elaborates in what senses αἰσϑητόν (that which is 
perceived) may be used:
AISTHETON
kat’ auto kata symbebekos
idion koinon
While saying “the white thing 
is the son of Diares”, the white 
thing’s being the son of Diares is 
incidental.
Sight
Hearing
Touch
Taste
Smell
(κύριως ἐστίν αἱσϑητά, 
πρὸς ἅ ἡ οὐσία πέφυκεν 
ἑκάστης αἰϑήσεως)
Motion
Rest
Number
Shape
Size
Among the different types of αἰσϑήσεις, κοινὴ αἴσϑησις is one key concept for any 
comprehension of γνωρίζειν. κοινὴ αἴσϑησις (general perception) as distinct from 
the other basic five perceptions, implies our grasp and awareness of one ob-
ject’s being in motion or being at rest; its being “one” or a many of them being 
“many”; or one object having this or that shape; or being this or that size.
With regard to γνωρίζειν, when a person recognizes (γνωρίζει), it occurs to him/
her that this certain object is, and that it is standing within his recognition 
scope. But considering the whatness of this object that is newly recognized, an 
obscurity still takes place.
23 Ibid., 427b 7–13.
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“Not knowing what to look for”, however, is a state of not recognizing, a being 
unaware of the presence of a particular object. Nevertheless it is very much pos-
sible for a person to notice something, take it as his/her object and then start an 
inquiry concerning its nature.
Thus, in the above analysis we have successfully laid out that it is an ill choice 
to use the term εἰδέναι in both of the cases that are presented in the eristic ar-
gument, for the specific meanings and their implications are being veiled by it.
We had however claimed before that the argument creates the illusion that there 
isn’t any possibility of ζητέιν. After having analyzed the argument philologically 
we can now rewrite and relook at it:
(a) A human being cannot search either for what he/she knows (ἐπίστασϑαι) or 
for what he/she does not know (γιγνώσκειν). He/she cannot search for what 
he/she knows (ἐπίστασϑαι) — since he/she knows (ἐπίστασϑαι) it, there is no 
need to search — nor for what he/she does not know (γιγνώσκειν), for he/
she does not know (γιγνώσκειν) what to look for. (80e) 
(a’) A human being cannot search for what he/she knows (ἐπίστασϑαι) —since 
he/she knows it, there is no need to search (T)
 A human being cannot search for what he/she does know (γνωρίζειν), for 
he/she does not know what to look for. (T)
Conclusion: A human being cannot search either for what he/she knows 
(ἐπίστασϑαι) or for what he/she does not know (γνωρίζειν) (T)
The argument now seems to contain two true premises and a true conclusion 
derived most healthily out of these. Besides, there is no trace of any paradox.
Furthermore, having analyzed the argument in this way it is necessary to state 
that it is very much possible for a man or a woman to search for (1) what he/she 
does not know (οὐκ ἐπίσταται) and (2) also for what he/she knows (γνωρίζει)24. 
Therefore one is not at a loss about starting with an inquiry about something.
24 One recognizes something, one perceives/is aware that that thing is, then the inquiry con-
cerning that object starts.
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The following table indicates the domain of the eristic argument and the do-
main of any possible ζητέιν (inquiry):25
ζητέιν ζητέιν
αἴσϑησις→γνωρίζειν →ἐπίστασϑαι
Before 
αἴσϑησις &
γνωρίζειν 
no ζητέιν
(inquiry) as the 
argument points 
out.
Perceive, recognize, 
choose one object 
to conduct your 
investigation
This is where a 
certain type of 
ζητέιν (inquiry) 
comes about
Where the inquiry 
concerning some 
one object comes to 
an end and reaches 
a stability: epi-
istemi; to stand firm 
upon some place.25
No ζητέιν as the 
argument suggests.
Another chapter in this inquiry requires that we investigate into what Plato is 
trying to state by introducing the εἴκων of ἀνάμνησις. For as we have stated in 
the beginning of this paper many scholars point out to ἀνάμνησις as the solution 
Plato offers for the eristic problem regarding knowing at 80d. 
When we follow the text we see that in passages following 81c Socrates intro-
duces the argument which suggests that learning is recollection (ἀνάμνησις).
...[F]or searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection.26
In order to show that learning is recollection, Socrates asks Meno to fetch one 
of the slaves that work for him, and with proper questioning Socrates makes the 
slave almost solve a geometrical problem. Meanwhile Socrates asks Meno to ob-
serve this questioning in order to find out whether Socrates is teaching the slave 
something that he didn’t know beforehand. For he claims the following: ‘I shall 
do nothing more than ask questions, and not teach him.’27 
25 See Greek-English Lexicon by H. G. Liddell, Harper&Brothers Publishers, New York 1853.
26 τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανϑάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν. (Translation: Plato, op. cit., 81d.)
27 Ibid., 84c.
What the “eristic” argument points 
out and is right about pointing at
FV_01_2017.indd   18 26. 10. 17   11:08
19
meno's “paradox”: an analysis of the eristic argument
Socrates, in explaining how he shall question the slave, asserts that he is only 
going to ask for the opinions (δόξαι) in him (84d). The slave then obviously 
has some opinions in him, which he held prior to or will end up forming upon 
Socrates’ questioning him. However we know that the intention Socrates had 
when calling out for this slave boy instead of someone else was to invite some-
one into the discussion who had no prior knowledge or training in geometry, 
and thus he called for the slave boy. However when approaching this issue, we 
should also always keep in mind that according to Plato “...neither ἐπιστήμη nor 
ἀληϑὴς δόξα come to men by nature but are acquired.”28 Therefore the answer to 
the question whether the slave boy ended up having the opinions he had about 
the geometrical puzzle directed at him by Socrates, or already had opinions 
concerning geometrical objects, and calculations regarding them, becomes ap-
parent. The boy, having no prior knowledge or training in geometry, came near 
Socrates neither with a geometrical ἐπιστήμη nor with an ἀληϑὴς δόξα but with 
one δύναμις which enabled him to form opinions (δόξαι) when Socrates tried the 
dialectical way of questioning on him.
Furthermore even when it comes to topics one is fairly knowledgeable about, 
unlike the slave boy in the example who has no knowledge at all regarding the 
subject of the discussion, we might assume that in each person there are usually 
some ‘raw’ opinions, which can be thought as some basic ‘convictions’ regard-
ing some one object which imply that that object is or might be this way or the 
other. These raw opinions stay the way they are, unless the person, who has 
them, is questioned. Forming these opinions, on the other hand, start right af-
ter we perceive or discern a particular object, and determine it as distinct from 
all the other objects around it. Only after this γιγνώσκειν we can obtain some 
opinions regarding the nature of this object. However, these opinions are things 
Plato held as “shameful” and “ugly” only because it is not possible to work on a 
solid ground using them because they lack λόγος, which plainly means that the 
argumentation process behind them is frail.
Therefore what Plato is trying to explain by using recollection is by no means 
that we have by nature ἐπιστήμη nor δόξα but only that we have such a nature 
that is capable of contriving them, and that we do not have ἐπιστήμη or δόξα by 
nature but only have them δυνάμει.
28 Ibid., 98d.
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In passages following 86c we see Socrates persisting vigorously that ‘one should 
seek to find out what one does not know’29. With this remark that Socrates 
makes, we are also reminded of the ἐριστικὸς λόγος that is uttered in 80e.
What we have conducted so far is not a mere etymological analysis but a phi-
lo-logical one30 and this analysis of the eristic argument makes the following 
clear:
(a) The argument Socrates introduces at 80e is by no means a paradox.
(b) There is no ἀπορία awaiting that person who wants to conduct an investiga-
tion concerning some one thing.
(c) The eristic feature of the argument is due to the wide meaning of the term 
εἰδέναι that is used in this very argument exactly to create the illusion of a 
paradox.
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